On Monday, the United States honored the sacrifices of its fallen soldiers. With Iran continuing to pursue a nuclear program and its President envisioning a world without either the United States or Israel, making threats to annihilate Israel, repeatedly denying the Holocaust, and rapidly accumulating domestic power, Americans would do well to remember history's lessons.

The developments leading to World War II provide perhaps the best case study on would-be aggressors. Recalling those lessons offers perhaps the best chance to avoid a situation where war becomes inevitable. In fact, the Iranian leadership is currently employing much of the same playbook that the Axis Powers utilized in their quest for power and empire.

Three lessons stand out in particular:

" If a state wants war, it prepares for peace: A state that has aggressive designs often seeks to create the perception that it desires peace. Under this cover, it masks its true pursuits. At the same time, it continues to build its military capacities to shift the balance of power in its favor. If a nation's increased diplomatic activity is accompanied by a substantial augmentation of its military manpower and weaponry, this disparity in actions could be a strong indication that the state's diplomacy is little more than a ruse.

Even as Germany and Italy engaged in increasing acts of aggression, they continued to seek non-aggression pacts, negotiated solutions to their demands, and security guarantees. On May 17, 1937, The Washington Post reported that Germany was seeking to enter into a 25-year mutual defense treaty with Great Britain, France, and Belgium. In December 1938, Germany sought a non-aggression agreement with France. In August 1939, following bilateral discussions between Germany and Italy, it was reported that both countries were in "100 percent agreement" that the dispute over Danzig was "not worth war" and would be resolved peacefully. Instead, Germany and Italy employed ceaseless diplomatic activity to deceive the world and buy time to prepare for fresh acts of aggression that inevitably followed.

One should not assume that would-be aggressors would be bound by the terms of treaties to which they agree. Such nations typically leave a trail of broken promises in their wake, as their appetite for conquest drives them relentlessly forward. Treaties become just an additional instrument by which such states pursue their ambitions. Once such states succeed, they shift the proverbial goal posts forward, and their new demands render earlier treaties obsolete. On March 19, 1939, The Washington Post reported, "The Munich policy of appeasement suffered a common death with the Republic of Czechoslovakia. This policy was based on the premise that Chancellor Adolf Hitler's promises could be trusted. It was built on the assumption that once 'justice' was rendered to the Sudeten Germans, Hitler himself would respect the right of self-determination of the Czechs."

" Expanding ambition can lead to a greater tendency to use military force: Act of aggression entail a state's employing force to pursue overly large ambitions that could not be obtained through the diplomatic process or reasoned consent of those affected. The risk of aggression is highest when a state experiences both increasing ambitions among its leaders and virulent nationalism among a growing sector of its population. World War II demonstrated that the human appetite for power can surpass the restraints of rationality. Once a leader's ambition overwhelms reason, his calculations become strongly biased toward the use of force. Then, even Las Vegas-style odds are sufficiently attractive for such leaders to initiate military campaigns.

In the years leading up to World War II, Hitler's and Mussolini's growing ambitions, excessive German and Italian nationalism, and British and French appeasement all converged to greatly accelerate increases in Germany's and Italy's demands. Nazi Germany's demands increased from militarization of the Rhineland to incorporation of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland area to occupation of all of Czechoslovakia to annexation of Danzig to conquest of most of Poland to possession of African colonies. Italy demanded an end to its Versailles Treaty obligations and later possession of Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and Tunisia. Afterward, both states later made it their mission to create a "new Europe."

" Don't underestimate a rival's capabilities or overestimate your own: The tendency to overestimate one's capacity to deal with the rising threat posed by a would-be aggressor can lead to complacency and inaction that makes it possible for an aggressor to accumulate greater power than would otherwise be the case. Prior to the outbreak of the major fighting in World War II, that was exactly the calculus that defined the approach undertaken by much of Europe and the United States.

In September 1938, Raymond Leslie Buell, President of the Foreign Policy Association wrote, "Despite Hitler's recent boasts, Germany is more vulnerable to blockade than in 1914. It does not have the foreign assets, the merchant marine, or the navy which Germany had before the last war. Despite the four-year plan Germany must still import about 30 percent of its raw materials; and it cannot possibly produce the oil or the cotton needed for a war of long duration." In October 1939, "the most favorable statistical presentation" concluded that it was "doubtful" that Germany could sustain a major war for even three years. Harvard University Professor J. Anton De Haas, one of the world's leading economists at the time, was even less impressed with German capabilities and believed that the German war machine could collapse within a year. In January 1939, 90% of Germans were described as opposed to the Nazi regime.

On September 1, 1939, The New York Times reported, "It is certain that Chancellor Hitler..., while raving against Britain, fears France more. The best proof of that fact is that the press of Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels is violent in its attacks on London, but is soft-pedaling those on Paris." Just over eight months later, Nazi Germany launched a massive attack on France and on June 25, 1940, France had surrendered.

When one analyzes would-be aggressors, one should be careful not to selectively interpret events toward one's desires. One should not assume the best until there is strong and credible evidence for it. Otherwise, one can become highly vulnerable to unpleasant surprises.

Today, the pre-World War II template is invaluable when it comes to the issue of Iran's nuclear activities. Iran's claims that its program is "peaceful" and strictly for "civilian energy" notwithstanding, Iran's unwavering refusal to limit its nuclear enrichment activities, its strident threats against Israel, and its ongoing military buildup suggest far more sinister aims. Against such a backdrop, the international community would do well to remember World War II's lessons. They should be particularly careful to avoid taking approaches that demonstrate or imply weakness. The demand that Iran verifiably cease its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities must be unconditional and non-negotiable. Otherwise, the clock could run toward the day when Iran becomes a nuclear power capable of wreaking enormous havoc in the Middle East and beyond.